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Cuba: The Challenges  
of Change*
Wolf Grabendorff
Very few countries in the world have been as dependent for their 
development –or the lack of it– on external actors as Cuba. Since its 
revolution in 1959 the country has been suffering from the impact of 
international politics inspired by economic or geopolitical factors. The 
development of its post-revolutionary society and the survival of its 
model have basically depended on the support of or its denial by the 
two Cold War superpowers. At the same time the Cuban revolutionary 
regime has tried to project itself externally and to influence the inter-
national power balance by using quite unconventional measures. In 
the post-Cold War period other external actors, principally Venezuela, 
R E S E A R C H  &  A N A LY S I S
*An earlier version of this article was commissioned and published by the Norwe-
gian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) under the title “Cuba: Reforming 
the Economy and Opening Society” in September 2014.
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 but to some extent also China and Brazil, have been essential in their 
support for the continuity of the Cuban model. Even the historic events 
of the 17th of December 2014 and the slow process of normalizing the 
relationship1 with the US - interrupted by the announcement of its 
partial dismantling of June 16th 2017 in Miami by President Trump 
-will probably not change the situation in the near future. 
Additionally the role of the Cuban diaspora should not  be overesti-
mated, since about 15% of Cuba’s population has left over the last 
decades because of the lack of economic and political opportunities. 
Especially now, 60 years after the revolution, remittances from abroad 
represent Cuba’s most important source of income and constitute a 
crucial financial input in the recent establishment of non-state en-
terprises. In many respects Cuba already represents an example of a 
well-functioning transnational society2 that is completely opposite to 
what the Cuban revolution with its strong nationalist flavor wanted 
to achieve. The changes under way during the last years, called by the 
Cuban government the “actualization of the Cuban model”, are conse-
quently determined principally by “intermestic” factors, a combination 
of external and internal interests, and the influences of various sectors 
of Cuban society and their foreign counterparts. 
During the last decade the need to adapt the country’s development 
model had become obvious to the Cuban government, and only the 
way in which changes are implemented and the pace and extent of 
the reforms have been a matter of controversial internal discussions. 
The central problem facing the Cuban leadership is to what extent the 
Cuban revolutionary model can be adapted to the rapidly changing 
conditions of a globalized world in which it is not realistic to count 
on continuous subsidies from the diaspora or from ideologically close 
allies. Up to a certain point the reform process seems to be based on a 
“trial-and-error” method with the clear intention of postponing all dra-
matic changes until the retirement of the “revolutionary generation”, 
which will likely occur in 2018. Undoubtedly the reforms currently 
under way have already produced some remarkable changes in the 
Cuban model3 and have strengthened the position of president Raúl 
Castro4, who was elected by the Cuban National Assembly in February 
2008, and who has announced stepping down as president – but not as 
party leader – in February 2018, although internal disagreements among 
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the party leadership between the reform sectors and the status-quo 
advocates are slowing down and complicating the process.
Concepts and perspectives of economic reforms
Already in April 2011 the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party 
of Cuba (PCC) in Havana discussed and authorized its famous 
guidelines (Lineamientos de la política económica y social), which 
were widely seen as an effort to modernize the Cuban economy and 
simultaneously improve the legitimacy of the Cuban government. 
Since then the major discussion has been between those who want 
to move quickly towards a mixed economy, with a strong emphasis 
on state capitalism, and those who fear the entire reform process and 
its possible results not only for the Cuban economic model but even 
more so for the stability of the political system. The expectations that 
the 7th Congress of the PCC in April 2016 would generate a more 
dynamic reform process and clearer orientations for future public 
policies were disappointed.
The obvious need for the opening up of major sectors of the Cuban 
economy to foreign investment and some sectors to the establishment 
of national private enterprises must be seen in the context of steadily 
declining productivity and a lack of sufficient public funds to maintain 
an incipient modernization process. Only a reformed economy will 
allow a more productive integration of the island into the changing 
world economy and reduce its vulnerability resulting from its reliance 
on external subsidies. Additionally the government had become well 
aware of the frustration of large parts of the population with declining 
living standards and reduced social benefits, while bureaucratization 
and corruption were clearly on the rise. Implementing wide economic 
reforms without major political change seems therefore to be the 
overriding priority of the Cuban government5, which is seeking to 
avoid resistance to the reform measures and thereby facilitating the 
legitimacy of the next government in 2018.
The pace of the reform process has been described by Raúl Castro as 
one “without haste, but also without pause”. Despite the preoccu-
pation of the government with the speed of certain market-oriented 
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reforms, no master plan seems to be in evidence, but the economic 
updating process is mainly concentrated on six goals:
•  a general improvement of living conditions;
•  a mayor reduction of state employment in many sectors;
•  an expansion of private proprietary rights;
•  a boost in government income through increasing taxation;
•  a major attraction of foreign investment and technology; and
•  a strengthening of the currency through convergence of the current 
two monetary systems. 
The announced massive reduction of state employment by about a 
million jobs seems to be falling behind schedule because of the slow 
implementation of the necessary administrative reforms and decen-
tralization processes. The extension of the non-state sector, where 
self-employment has been allowed for some years, is rather limited and 
has so far affected a bit more than  half a million people, mainly in the 
services sector and excluding health and education. The progressive 
loosening of the US restrictions on trade and financial transfers since 
the beginning of 2015 was perceived as a possibility to widen and 
strengthen the non-state sector more rapidly, but the restrictions for 
US tourist travel and US business activities announced by the Trump 
administration have made such projections rather doubtful.
So far the most visible economic changes are linked to what the 
government considers to be the daily needs of the population. The 
prohibition on buying and selling private apartments or vehicles was 
lifted in 2012, while agricultural cooperatives were allowed to sell 
their products directly to consumers without the state as intermediary. 
Recently, the provision of public credit for the self-employed and 
cooperatives was introduced. Even though the self-employed have 
carved out a more independent life for themselves since 2010, their 
dependency on outside financing has become a problem and many of 
the new private enterprises (about 60%) rely on finance from relatives 
or friends living abroad. These forms of external financing, remittances 
or donations, mainly from the U.S., but also from Spain and some 
Latin American countries, constitute the largest source of income in 
Cuba, surpassing tourism, external services and trade, and appear to 
be the major factor in the establishment of a market-oriented sector in 
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the economy. Cuban society is now characterized by huge differences 
between those who have access to foreign currency – about 50% of 
the general population, but almost 70% of people living in Havana, 
according to current estimates – and those who cannot rely on the 
booming black market to satisfy their daily needs. The expectations 
of most Cubans about a rapid adaptation and modernization of the 
Cuban socioeconomic model are likely to be unaccomplished, even 
after the unsteady process of normalization of the relationship with 
the U.S., since these expectations are strongly oriented towards the 
way of life of the diaspora in Miami, which has become more visible 
since 2013 after the travel ban for Cubans was almost entirely lifted, 
with the sole exception of security and medical personnel.
From the government’s point of view the pace of these reforms has to 
be sufficiently gradual to avoid negative effects of the success of private 
enterprise on the political structure of the state, while at the same 
time it has to be sufficiently rapid to alleviate the current economic 
crisis and thereby facilitate better governability. The question of how 
to deal politically with the new market-oriented economic actors was 
already a preoccupation of the 6th. PCC Congress in 2011, and even 
more so at the 1st. National Conference of the PCC held on January 
28th and 29th 2012. It seems that the government tends to favor the 
cooperative format because of its collective nature.6 But so far it has 
quite openly tolerated the overwhelmingly individual character of the 
self-employed sector of the economy and attempts to limit its mem-
bers’ private benefits only through regulation and taxation. Thereby 
the Cuban government has by now quite notably accepted the fact that 
the success of the self-employed will produce an increasing inequality 
in the Cuban society as an obvious by-product of the necessary mo-
dernization of the economic model.  The government is very much 
aware that the reform process has to be channeled through a filter of 
bureaucratic safeguards to prevent the transformation process from 
creating increasing social conflicts. 
Resistance to change is not only ideological, but also a result of the 
obvious fear of a large proportion of the state bureaucracy that its 
members will lose the very limited benefits of their position because 
of the intended reforms. The  main problem of updating the Cuban 
economic model is precisely the excessive concentration of economic 
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decision-making at the state level, as well as the necessary and inevita-
ble reduction of public spending, which it is seen by the reformers as 
the greatest challenge the process will have to confront. The essence 
of the reform of the economic model is the urgent issue of improving 
productivity. Nevertheless any privatization of the state enterprises has 
been completely ruled out.7 The Cuban internal market is still tightly 
controlled - but not regulated - by state authorities.8 The chronic defi-
cit in external trade has been a factor since the Cuban revolution and 
even now very few products are available for export: nickel and some 
pharmaceutical and biotechnological products are the principal items 
sufficiently competitive in the world market. However, Cuba has been 
very innovative in the development of new lines of exports, basically 
of professional services, not only in the much acclaimed health sector, 
but also in terms of  professionals in social services of various kinds, 
principally to Venezuela and other Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas 
(ALBA) countries, but also to Brazil and some African countries as well. 
To readdress the shortage of capital in a society that has traditionally 
spent all its income on public goods, the modernization of the 1995 
Foreign Investment Law in March 20149 has become the clearest ex-
pression by the Cuban government that it needs to accept capitalist 
incentives to attract more external financing. Foreign investment is 
now not only welcome but sought after in all sectors of the economy 
except health, education and security. The expectations are especially 
high with regard to the new development zone around Mariel port, to 
which Brazil has already committed almost $1 billion in development 
funding. Numerous other projects have been announced by Mexico, 
some European Union (EU) member states, China and Russia. The 
latter has positioned itself as a major Cuban economic partner by for-
giving 90% of the island’s $35 billion historical debt to it and stretching 
the repayment of the remainder over ten years, with the intention of 
reinvesting the entire amount in the Cuban economy. 
The idea behind the new development zone is to create a tax-free 
zone around the deep-water Mariel port for the production of a 
variety of industrial goods that will help to increase trade. The aim 
is to provide the Post –Panamex container ships with a conveniently 
located, modern deep-water port for trade distribution in the entire 
Caribbean Basin after the opening of the modernized Panama Canal. 
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Now this concept appears quite realistic given the partial lifting of 
the traffic restrictions for shipping lines serving Cuba by the US. The 
main criticism of this megaproject, which is being sold by the gover-
nment as a “magic” solution to most of the structural and financial 
deficiencies of Cuba’s current economic situation, is that such an 
enormous investment effort may come too late and will also have to 
compete with similar developments like the Colon Free Trade Zone in 
Panama. There is also the fear that much-needed foreign investment 
in the general infrastructure of the country will now be concentrated 
mainly in the new Mariel zone and be beneficial to foreign companies 
and the state, but not to the development of other non-state sectors 
across the country. 
An additional obstacle for implementing the new investment strategy 
is the remaining illegality of many types of economic interaction bet-
ween U.S. and Cuban non-state enterprises. Until this legal situation is 
finally resolved it seems doubtful that foreign investment will arrive in 
such substantial amounts as to create the desired impact for the entire 
economy. The envisioned 30% annual increase in foreign direct inves-
tment –about $2 billion– is considered by many Cuban economists 
to be unachievable, at least in the short term. As a result it appears to 
be extremely doubtful that the decentralization initiatives and a bold 
change in the policies regulating property and business rights will be 
sufficient to guarantee that about 50% of the national economy will 
be in the hands of non-state actors by 2018,  originally foreseen by the 
government guidelines. But the new economic dynamics in the country, 
resulting from the loosening of some of the US sanctions, might help 
to reach that objective in a not too distant future.
A better performance of the Cuban economy will depend to a large 
extent on the currency reforms announced on March 4th 2014 by the 
Cuban government, but without reference to when it would actually be 
implemented. Since the withdrawal of the U.S. dollar from internal use 
in 2004 Cuba has experienced the parallel application of two currencies. 
This dual system of an internal Cuban peso (CUP) and a convertible 
peso (CUC) –with a relationship of 25 to 1– makes it impossible to 
establish clear cost and benefit criteria, while simultaneously having 
very negative effects on the international competitiveness of the Cuban 
economy.10 In the short term the necessary currency reform will clearly 
Cuba: The Challenges of Change
PE
N
SA
M
IE
N
TO
 P
RO
PI
O
 4
5
40
create winners and losers in the society, but over the medium term 
it should allow the Cuban economy to function better and not only 
in the internal market. Since Cuba is currently not a member of the 
various international financial organizations (IMF, World Bank, etc.), 
but might consider re-joining them under certain circumstances - the 
government cannot ask them for assistance with the management of 
the unification of the dual-currency system, which might need a mo-
netary reserve of about $15 billion and a carefully managed technical 
preparations to avoid any disruptions. The current relationship of 
the CUC to the CUP and the exchange rate with the U.S. dollar are 
crucial indicators for the future development of Cuba’s international 
competitiveness and will be decisive for the relationship between the 
state and non-state sectors of a new Cuban economy.
To what extent this economic reform process can be seen as preparation 
for a political transition in Cuba is widely discussed among Cubans 
themselves, as well as by the diaspora, the U.S., the EU and Latin 
American countries. The problem of restructuring an entire economic 
model usually results in a great deal of corruption. The Russian and 
Chinese examples are indicative of what Cubans might expect once the 
tight social control imposed since the revolution disappears. Even now 
most Cubans are aware of and disillusioned with the notable increase 
of inequality11 and the increasing breakdown of moral and civic values 
in a society that used to be proud of its commitment to social solida-
rity. Some are willing to accept that this is the price to be paid for the 
liberty to pursue their own interests, be they material or ideological, 
and to opt out of the collective system inherited from the revolution. 
As other transitions from socialist systems have demonstrated – like 
those that the countries of Eastern Europe experienced after the collap-
se of the Soviet Union –this process often leads to a rapid disintegration 
of society, with the inevitable loss of a generation or a sector of society 
that identified –whether voluntarily or out of necessity– with the for-
mer socialist system. Therefore it is quite understandable that a large 
part of the public administration in Cuba now fears that it will lose its 
limited benefits, which are so far related to state regulation of foreign 
trade, foreign investment and tourism. The obvious lack of interest 
in any type of far-reaching economic or even limited political reform 
is very visible in this part of Cuban society. The government seems 
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to be aware of this and is trying to implement the necessary changes 
gradually so as to avoid protest from those parts of society that have 
been most identified with the socialist system. Granting permission 
to the managers of state enterprises to play a larger role in the internal 
decision-making processes of these enterprises can therefore be seen 
not only as a measure to increase the efficiency in the state sector, but 
also as a possible extension of benefits to the state bureaucracy during 
the reform period, while simultaneously increasing the country’s move 
to a more market-oriented economy.12
Slow motion towards political reform
The political dimensions of the adaptation process have already led to 
changes in Cuba’s bureaucratic leadership. The new division of labor 
between the PCC leadership and the armed forces seems to consist in 
the party’s efforts to limit the political reform process wherever possible, 
while the armed forces –with support from some academics– appear to 
be concentrating on the reform of the Cuban model while occupying 
more and more key government positions. The armed forces are seen 
by many Cubans as the avant-garde of the economic reform process 
because of their experience in controlling directly or indirectly an im-
portant share13 of the country’s economy and managing some of the 
most successful sectors of the state enterprises, and, at the same time, 
they are seen as the most pragmatic part of the government structure.
Since the Sixth Congress of the PCC in 2011 the extent of political 
reforms has not been impressive. The logic of an authoritarian one-
party state has not been challenged and the very weak, divided and 
strongly individualistic opposition groups suffer still from harassment 
by state organs or state-supported groups. The main focus of these 
dissident groups is the human rights situation in Cuba, which has 
been continuously criticized by the U.S. and some EU member states, 
where these groups’ message is much more visible than on the island 
itself. Some support for opposition activities has always come from 
the Catholic Church, which has at times also functioned as a mediator 
between dissidents and the government, especially regarding the fate 
of political prisoners. 
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The attempts of the current government to invite and allow more cri-
ticism have also impacted on the restricted communications scenario 
in Cuba. In spite of a very limited individual access to the Internet, 
some new online publications are helping to overcome the typical 
problems of closed societies, where dissident voices generally are lar-
gely excluded from public discussion. Probably it will be in this very 
sensitive area where the normalization process with the US could have 
the most noticeable impact on the role of the civil society in Cuba, 
given the recent agreements between the two governments to open 
up the communication sector.
The liberalization of travel and migration policies was probably the 
reform measure that was most welcomed by the Cuban population and 
the one with the most political, economic and social consequences. 
The massive increase in mobility not only between Cuba and the U.S. 
(because of the extensive family bonds with Cuban-Americans), but 
also between the island and Latin America and Spain, has surpassed 
all government projections. The ability of Cubans to live and work 
abroad for up to two years will undoubtedly have an enormous impact 
on future perceptions in Cuba of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
island’s society. The need to expand the political reform process is felt 
more strongly outside the party and government circles, but by no 
means only there. But even within the party leadership a consensus 
seems to be evolving that only a transition controlled by the PCC will 
be able to avoid a traumatic rupture of the current political system.14 
Many Cubans believe strongly that the modernization of the economy 
and the opening up to outside influences and experiences will almost 
automatically lead to a more plural society and a political system 
where the costs and benefits are divided up very differently from the 
current situation.
Reintegration into Latin America
The Summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean 
States (CELAC) in Havana in January 2014 and the Summit of the 
Americas in Panama in April 2015 were a clear demonstration that 
Cuba has become again an important part of the Latin American com-
munity. The policy of participating in all important regional discussions 
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over the last decade and developing close bilateral relations with almost 
all of the countries in the region has been quite successful for a country 
which had been called “isolated” by the U.S. for many decades.15 The 
Cuban presidency of CELAC has been praised for its careful balancing 
of diverging interests in the region and its efforts to participate in 
the creation of a regional voice without much of ideological bias. But 
beyond its regional role, Cuba has also proved that it can contribute 
to the process of resolving long-standing regional and even national 
problems of other Latin American countries. In the peace process 
between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla movement, negotiated between 
2012 and 2016 in Havana, Cuba’s support was of outstanding impor-
tance for Colombia, in spite of the latter’s very different relationship 
with the U.S, which has been historically the opposite of that of Cuba. 
Also, earlier efforts in the peace process with the National Liberation 
Army (ELN), the other significant Colombian guerrilla group, or in the 
recurring bilateral conflicts between Colombia and Venezuela could 
not have been mediated without Cuba’s good offices. This responsible 
stand of Cuban foreign policy has been the most important argument 
of the Latin American countries in their attempt to convince the U.S. 
that Cuba can no longer be called a state sponsor of terrorism. The 
long awaited decision taken after the Panama Summit of the Americas 
2015 by the Obama administration to remove Cuba from the list of 
sponsors of terrorism has certainly facilitated the formal process of 
normalization between the former “closest of enemies”.
Since the previous Summit of the Americas in Cartagena in 2012 Latin 
American efforts to reintegrate Cuba in their own community was also 
aimed to the wider hemispheric community. Latin American countries 
therefore conditioned their attendance at the Americas Summit in 
Panama in April 2015 on Cuba being invited. The role Cuba has played 
during this last Summit of the Americas has contributed significantly 
to the success of this meeting of hemispheric leaders and thereby 
opened the way for the restructuring of inter-American relations, with 
the collateral - and probably politically intended - effect of improving 
considerably the image of the Obama administration in Latin America. 
In the last decade many Latin American countries had already im-
proved and intensified bilaterally their relations with Cuba. Brazil, 
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especially during the Lula da Silva presidency, had become one of the 
major trading partners and investors until the change of government 
in 2016. Also Mexico, under President Nieto, has made enormous 
diplomatic efforts to overcome the period of poor bilateral relations 
and has announced its interest in becoming an important economic 
partner in the special development zone of the new Mariel port. In 
that respect Cuba can still count on important diplomatic support 
and continued investment interest from some Latin American part-
ners, in spite of the recent, very important geopolitical changes in the 
region, which have undoubtedly affected regional support for Cuba’s 
“autonomous role” and thereby also reduced considerably its capacity 
to influence regional issues.
Cuba’s special relationship with Venezuela has been an important 
part in the “downgrading” of Cuba´s regional voice. The future 
of the economically more than ideologically important bilateral 
relations is difficult to assess given the current political instability 
and possibly social implosion in Venezuela. Cuba´s entire reform 
process has already experienced increasing and unexpected stress 
in the context of the ups and downs in the normalization process 
with the U.S. and suffers now again from serious concern over the 
island’s vulnerability to external factors. At present almost 40% of 
Cuba’s trade is with Venezuela, which in spite of the impact on the 
island economy is by no means comparable to previous periods of 
economic dependency upon the U.S. or the Soviet Union. During 
the last decade the estimated total yearly income from commercial 
relations and services between Cuba and Venezuela were estimated 
at $5-6 billion depending partly on the price of oil. Since 2014 the 
economic crisis in Venezuela has severely reduced benefits of that 
close economic and ideological relationship. Therefore a possible 
“Venezuelan shock” might have similar, but by no means identical, 
consequences to the historical Soviet shock in 1991, when Cuba’s 
economy contracted by about 35% and a so-called “special period” 
started, that lasted until 1994, with serious cuts in social spending 
and severe suffering for the population. Cuban economists estimate 
now that “only” about 20% of gross national product depends on 
favorable external economic conditions, meaning that this time the 
shock might be not as severe as then.
Wolf Grabendorff
45
PE
N
SA
M
IE
N
TO
 P
RO
PI
O
 4
5
It is not only the economic fallout that Cuba has to fear from the 
serious decline of governability in Venezuela, but the political bond 
with the chavista regime will  also have to be re-evaluated. Given such 
uncertain scenarios, a “plan B”, referring to Brazil, has in the last years 
often been mentioned in Havana. However, recent political and eco-
nomic developments in Brazil have meanwhile led to favoring a “plan 
C”, in this case, China, its third trade partner and in some way also an 
often mentioned possible model for a changing development strategy. 
To what extent such a “fall back plan” will be able to contribute to 
cushioning a possible Venezuelan shock for the Cuban economy will 
only become apparent over time. But in any case, the secret hope in 
Havana in the last two years, that the “real plan B” would be to count 
on the emerging strong economic relations with the U.S. might also 
have to be shelved since the policy reversal in June 2017 by the Trump 
administration. 
Reintegrating with the “global North”?
The reintegration of Cuba into the Latin American community and 
its successful presidency of CELAC, which is the EU’s central regional 
partner,16 have given Cuba a new incentive to finally institutionalize its 
relations with the EU. Up to now Cuba was the only Latin American 
country without any kind of formal bilateral EU- agreement. At the 
same time it was also the only Latin American country for which the 
EU had established in 1996 a “common position”, which conditioned 
formal relations on democratic political reforms and was therefore seen 
by Havana as a form of interference in its sovereign internal affairs18. 
The common position came about after the shooting down of two small 
U.S. aircraft with four Cubans exiles on board by the Cuban armed 
forces in 1996. Before this incident the two sides had already held 
advanced discussions about a cooperation agreement.19 The reforms 
under way in Cuba have led in February 2014 to the EU decision to 
make a new effort to find a mutually acceptable agreement with Cuba 
that will facilitate trade and investment and institutionalize a dialo-
gue on human rights which was signed as a “Political Dialogue and 
Cooperation Agreement” in December 2016, followed by the formal 
cancellation of the common position by the European Parliament in 
July 2017. The recent, unprecedented, visit by the High Representative 
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for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU has underlined 
the importance of Cuba for the EU after the beginning of the norma-
lization process of its relations with the U.S. and demonstrated the 
interest of the EU in not losing its current economic position in Cuba.
Cuba had been able to establish sound bilateral relations with many 
EU member states and has concluded bilateral cooperation agreements 
with 19 of them even before the new agreement with the EU was 
reached, which is economically quite important for Cuba, since it is 
the island’s main foreign investor (about 60%) and its second-largest 
trading partner (about 40%), while about one-third of all tourists come 
from EU member states. EU development cooperation with Cuba has 
averaged about €20 million per year and will increase considerably with 
the new agreement especially regarding sustainable development and 
technology transfer. The Cuban position with regard to the European 
intention to support market-oriented reforms and human rights with 
the agreement has been very clear: change in Cuba will never come 
about through external pressure – a conviction that the government has 
consistently maintained in all its foreign policy positions. It appears, 
therefore, that for both sides the new agreement will not so much be 
about economic benefits, but rather political gains, given that the EU 
wanted to formalize its relations with Cuba before a possible lifting of 
the U.S. embargo and Cuba has thereby now demonstrated to the U.S. 
its diplomatic capacity to achieve formal acceptance of its economic 
model and governmental structure. Indirectly the successful negotia-
tion process between Cuba and the EU has therefore contributed also 
to the change in the original U.S. position. The historical triangulation 
between EU and U.S. policies in relations with Cuba might now get 
a new twist in case the EU and Cuba will be able to agree on certain 
multilateral issues –climate change, global health, plurality of deve-
lopment models etc.– which the current U.S. administration do not 
approve. The EU might turn out in general as an easier partner for 
Cuba´s economic transition process, if it moves in the direction of a 
mixed economy with strong state capitalist characteristics.
The relationship between the U.S. and Cuba has been called “trau-
matic” on both sides and carries a heavy historical baggage not only 
because of the way in which Cuba’s pre-revolutionary semi-colonial 
status related to the U.S. but also because of the revolution itself, the 
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U.S.-supported invasion attempt in 1961 and the missiles crisis in 
1962. Due to all these events and the influx into the U.S. of a large 
number of Cuban refugees since 1959, the island has become more a 
“domestic” than a foreign policy issue for the U.S. The trade embargo 
imposed in 1962 20 has been used by the Cuban government as the 
main reason for impeding economic development and has certainly 
also contributed to very difficult U.S. relations with some Latin 
American and EU countries. The clearly failed U.S. efforts over more 
than 50 years to change Cuba’s economic model and the country’s 
political regime has led to strong demands, even from within the U.S. 
itself, to change this policy. In 2009 the Obama administration had 
eliminated already some travel restrictions for Cuban-Americans and 
had also extended some travel possibilities for other U.S. citizens with 
the “people-to-people” concept, so that the number of U.S. visitors 
to Cuba has climbed to over 400,000 a year recently. It had also lifted 
the cap on remittances for family members of the Cuban-American 
community and since then cash and gift transfers to Cuban families 
have reached at least an estimated $ 2 billion per year. 
All recent U.S. polls have demonstrated that these measures have 
been seen as sufficient and that a major policy change towards Cuba is 
continuously supported by a majority of the U.S. population. In 2014 
two of those polls indicated that 56% of the U.S. population was in 
favor of dropping the embargo, while even 52% of Cuban-Americans in 
Florida shared this view and 68% were in favor of the U.S. establishing 
diplomatic relations with Havana. This major change in public opinion, 
which also reflects a generational change among the Cuban-American 
community, had certainly facilitated the decision of the Obama ad-
ministration to normalize the relations with Cuba. 
The ability of the Obama administration to overcome the severe oppo-
sition in Congress to overturning the Helms-Burton Act and lifting the 
embargo was always very uncertain given the general unwillingness of 
the Republican-controlled Congress to cooperate with this president, 
especially on such a divisive issue.  Many analysts in Havana are con-
vinced that for strictly domestic U.S. reasons, that are less related to 
voter opinion and more to massive campaign financing to candidates 
of both Democrats and Republicans from Cuban-Americans, it is very 
unlikely that a lifting of the U.S. embargo can be expected in the near 
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future in spite of the diplomatic normalization process and the strong 
increase of U.S. business interests in trading with and investing in 
Cuba.  But even without the consent of the US Congress the Obama 
administration was able through “executive orders or privileges” to 
profoundly change the relations between the two countries between 
2014 and 2016, especially in their economic and financial dimension.
The election of President Trump has been the most serious challenge 
for the modernization process of the Cuban model and possibly for 
the political transition process planned for 2018 as well. The historical 
visit to Havana of President Obama in March 2016 had been seen by 
the Cuban government as the beginning of a difficult but at least eco-
nomically promising relationship after decades of denial of accepting 
Cuba as a possible partner for trade, investment and general bilateral 
cooperation from the U.S. government. The expected new relations-
hip was also considered by many Cubans as well as Cuban-Americans 
as a perspective to facilitate future changes in Cuba. The turnabout 
of Trump´s new policy towards Cuba can be best characterized as 
a half-measure,21 to satisfy at one hand the Cuban-American hard-
liners in reversing many effects of President Obamas policies, but 
also to keep enough opportunities opened for U.S. business interests 
in Cuba. The effects might not only turn out quite negative for the 
Cuban private sector, which is very dependent on tourism and external 
financing, but also might reduce bilateral cooperation regarding the 
23 agreements reached so far, especially on issues of importance to the 
U.S. government like migration, drug control and military- to- mili-
tary contacts22. It can hardly be excluded that Trumps preference for 
domestic political considerations might hurt important U.S foreign 
policy interests related to hemispheric and global security problems. 
Russia´s “strategic partnership” with Cuba and China´s growing in-
fluence – both providing economic and military assistance– has been 
an open preoccupation for various U.S. administrations and Trump´s 
current policy initiatives could possibly open even wider geopolitical 
options for both of Cuba partners.
The challenge of this external part of the process of change which the 
Cuban government has to face consists of the urgent need of adapting 
the original roadmap of the internal transformation process until 2018 
to the entirely different and rapidly changing external conditions. Gi-
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ven the very different expectations within Cuban society as well as in 
the U.S., not only with regard to the pace of change but also to its final 
outcome, a more complicated transition process has to be anticipated 
as the next phase of Cuban history.
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in Comparative Perspective. Washington, D.C., Brookings, 2014.
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9. For details, see: Carmelo Mesa-Lago “Normalización de relaciones 
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Economic Growth: Cuba’s New Era”, in Cuba’s Economic Change in 
Comparative Perspective, Nº 2, Brookings, October 2013, here p. 28.
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June 28, 2017.
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15. For details see: Andrés Serbin “La política exterior de Cuba en un 
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Unión Europea”, in Adrián Bonilla Soria and Grace Jaramillo, (eds.), La 
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GIGA-Focus Lateinamerika Nº 2, Hamburg, GIGA, here p. 3.
18. For previous negotiations problems between the EU and Cuba, see 
Wolf Grabendorff  (1994). “Relaciones entre la Comunidad Europea 
y Cuba”, in Instituto de Relaciones Europeo-Latinoamericanas, (ed.) 
Cuba, apertura económica y relaciones con Europa, Madrid, IRELA, 
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M. LeoGrande (2015). “A Policy Long Past Its Expiration Date: US 
Economic Sanctions Against Cuba”, Social Research: An International 
Quarterly, vol. 82, Nº 4, Johns Hopkins University Press, Winter, pp. 
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20. See William M. LeoGrande (2017).“Trump Has Set U.S.-Cuba Rela-
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AbstrAct
Cuba: The Challenges of Change
Cuba has experienced regularly international interventions of diffe-
rent forms due to geopolitical and economic foreign interests. The 
construction and survival of a post-revolutionary economic and social 
model depended on the support or rejection of the superpowers during 
the Cold War. Almost 60 years after the Revolution its economy is still 
dependent on external factors and foreign financing. Cuba has now 
a double challenge: implementing an economic and political reform 
process and achieving its return to the hemispheric community.
resumen
Cuba: El desafío del cambio
Por intereses geopolíticos y económicos, Cuba padeció la constante 
intervención internacional. La construcción y la supervivencia de un 
Cuba: The Challenges of Change
PE
N
SA
M
IE
N
TO
 P
RO
PI
O
 4
5
56
modelo económico y social post-revolucionario, dependieron del apoyo 
o “del rechazo” de los países protagonistas durante la Guerra Fría, y casi 
60 años después de la Revolución, su economía está condicionada por 
factores y financiamiento externos. Cuba tiene ahora un doble desafío: 
alcanzar una reforma económica y política y lograr su reinserción en 
la comunidad hemisférica.
summArio
Cuba: Os desafios da mudança
Por interesses geopolíticos e econômicos, Cuba padeceu a constante 
intervenção internacional. A construção e a sobrevivência de um mo-
delo econômico e social pós-revolucionário dependeram do apoio ou 
do “desamparo” dos países protagonistas durante a guerra fria. Quase 
60 anos depois da revolução, sua economia está condicionada por 
fatores e financiamento externos. Cuba tem agora um duplo desafio: 
promover uma reforma econômica e política e conseguir sua reinserção 
na comunidade hemisférica.
